The severe anti-female bias in natality and child mortality that gives rise to India's missing women has been widely documented and various explanations ranging from agricultural labor demand to dowries have been offered in the literature. In general the low demand for girls has been interpreted as a rational response to economic constraints. This paper shows the importance of culture both in determining the non-economic value of girls and in shaping parental economic constraints. We find that conservative cultural attitudes, proxied by the electoral success of religious parties, is positively correlated with anti-female bias. Moreover, higher expenditure is negatively correlated with the number of girls. This suggests that we cannot rely on rising income levels, brought about by economic growth, to improve the demographic disadvantage faced by Indian women. Our policy recommendations therefore focus on changing attitudes of son-preference that motivate anti-female bias as much as enforcement of gender-equality legislation.
Introduction
The observation that certain regions in South and East Asia exhibit both sex ratios at birth and child survival rates that are highly skewed towards boys is certainly not new. In fact, over a decade ago Amartya Sen calculated that a staggering 100 million females are missing in the region (Sen 1992) , and countless articles before and since then have created an often heated debate about the causes and consequences and even the number of these missing women. In this article we examine sex ratios in India at birth and for all surviving children under five. Two of our findings are particularly important. First, while economic factors clearly affect the number of girls born and surviving, it is not the case that higher expenditure leads to more girls. In as far as girls are perceived to be more expensive by parents than boys, the increasing availability of pre-natal sex screening and sex-selective abortions accompanying growing income appears to dominate possible income constraints to raising girls. Partly in consequence we believe that cultural factors are driving sexratios in India. While cultural values are hard if not impossible to observe in census data, we find a statistically significant negative correlation between the number of girls born and the share of votes won by religious parties in a given district. This result should not be misconstrued as a claim of responsibility. Rather we argue that both voting for certain religious parties and a pronounced son preference are expressions of a particular conservative cultural mindset. Unless this mindset is changed, economic development might not lead to more balanced sex ratios.
India is interesting for several reasons. First, despite widespread improvements in the access to healthcare and nutrition the relative number of girls under five has actually fallen over the last ten years from 955 for every 1000 boys in 1991 to 930 in 2001.
1 Sen (2003) credits the increase in availability of pre-natal sex screening technology and sex-selective abortions for this development. Moreover, sex-ratios exhibit stark inter-regional heterogeneity. Compared to an approximate reference sex ratio at birth of 0.95 for Germany, 2001 state-level rates vary from 0.78 and 0.79 in Haryana and Punjab, respectively, to 1.00 and 0.99 in Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram.
2 The map in figure 1 reveals a strong geographic pattern with the lowest number of girls born in the North-Western parts of India. This development is problematic as the shortage of women for marriage does not seem to have led to a general rise in their bargaining power both before and after marriage, contrary to what might be expected. Rather, the severe lack of women in certain regions of India seems to have resulted in increased trade in "brides" between states, forced prostitution and sexual abuse of women and children.
3
A wide range of explanations have been offered for the lack of girls. Drew et al. (1986) and Oster (2006) , for example, point to Hepatitis B infections of females as a cause for the relatively high number of male births. Even assuming that India would otherwise have European sex ratios, however, this can only account for 20% of the missing women. Given that a counterfactual of European sex ratios in the absence of viral infection is implausible as other causes appear to be driving the low relative number of girls -after all Hepatitis B can explain at most 20% of the anti-female bias -and infections may therefore act as a substitute for deliberate sex-selection, this number is likely to overestimate the effect of Hepatitis as a value-neutral natural explanation. An additional 20% to 50% may be explained by discriminatory access to health services and nutrition (Oster 2005) . The question is then why girls are receiving less health care and food, and, furthermore, why this disadvantage seems to be almost exclusive to certain regions.
Economic arguments focus on the cost and benefit of raising boys and girls. Since women traditionally become part of their husband's extended family and are not expected to contribute to the financial support of their parents in old age, having sons has a positive effect on the expected standard of living of parents. This effect is less severe in regions where people practice village-level endogamy, that is where marriages tend to take place within a village, and daughters remain physically close to their parents (Agnihotri 1996 , Kishor 1993 , Dyson & Moore 1983 . A similar point is made by Lahiri & Self (2004 , 2005 who observe that endogamous practices in Southern India and even more so among the Muslim community can explain at least part of the differential sex ratios.
Dowry imposes a second direct and significant cost on the bride's parents. Although illegal, there is anecdotal evidence to support the conclusion that dowry payments are not only still demanded but that they often represent a severe financial burden for the household of the bride (Greenberg 2003) . Regional differences in marriage practices and an increase in real dowry payments over the last decades may then be at least partly responsible for the observed sex ratios. While there is no comprehensive study of dowry payments, with the partial exception of Rao (1994) , there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that dowry payments represent are substantial and that demands may have risen over the last decade or so. Amounts in the order of Rs. 1m (US$ 21,834) for upper middle class marriages are not uncommon and even low-income men, such as teachers or clerks, can command at least Rs. 300,000 (US$ 6,550). Non-resident Indian men, who often come with US permanent residence, have prices between Rs. 5m (US$ 109,170) and Rs. 200m (US$ 4, 366, 812) .
4 Compared to a median household expenditure of Rs. 1500 (US$ 32.8), such amounts are staggering and may provide sufficient incentives to prefer boys. Bardhan (1974 Bardhan ( , 1988 links the relatively low female birth and survival rates in the North East of India to agricultural practice. He observes that farmers in the regions with the lowest sex ratios grow mainly wheat and other cereals while the dominant crop in the Southern parts of India tends to be rice. If growing wheat is more male labour intensive than growing rice, perhaps due to the tasks involved, agricultural cultivation patterns could explain differential son preference across India. While this is a plausible explanation, it is not obvious that different crops have different sex-specific labor requirements and evidence from wheat-growing regions in Africa does not seem to support this argument. In any case, agricultural labor demand should not affect urban households, providing an empirical test for the hypothesis.
With rising per capita income in India it might be expected that economic constraints become less powerful and the relative number of girls increase over time. After all, richer parents do not have to rely solely on their sons for their survival in old age and -unless the income elasticities of dowry payments and wedding expenses exceed one -the relative price of girls should therefore fall. In addition, improving job opportunities for women may give them the resources to contribute to the financial support of their parents. The fact that sex-ratios have been falling as aggregate income has been rising seems thus at first inconsistent with a purely economic view of missing women. The availability of sex-selective abortion, however, complicates the picture. If the cost of aborting a daughter is lower than the cost of raising a girl, a slight increase in income might allow parents the choice to abort their daughter without, however, giving them the financial freedom to raise a girl. Although sex-selective abortions, like dowry demands, are illegal, (anecdotal) evidence suggests that they are well within the means of middle-class parents.
5 The relationship between average income and sex ratios is then unlikely to be linear and might include significant threshold effects.
In this paper we propose that economic constraints are often the consequence of cultural perceptions. Both dowry payments and support in old age are negotiated in a socio-cultural context and it might be argued that even the division of the majority of agricultural tasks is determined more by conventions than actual physical requirements. This argument is not new. Das Gupta (1987)'s detailed study of fertility and natality in Northern India finds that cultural variables constrain the role of women in such ways that they are an economic burden to their parents. The missing women are thus only a part of a more general framework of gender interactions in which culture and economics are inextricably linked. While these economic aspects of gender work through the parental budget constraints, non-economic factors might also be present in the utility function. Quite simply having a son might -at least ex ante -be more satisfying for parents. This is not to say that purely economic reasons are not fundamental determinants of sex ratios. Our conjecture is that the severity of economic constraints is to some extent determined by cultural variables and that, potentially, cultural traditions affect parents preferences differentially throughout India.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section discusses briefly the socioeconomic aspects of gender selection and establishes a link between conservative culture and son preferences. Since attitudes are difficult if not impossible to extract from census data, we argue that voting behaviour may be used as a proxy. Section 3 describes the data sources. The empirical analysis and a discussion of the results is found in section 4.
2 Sex-selection, culture and voting behaviour Culture can affect the worth -both economic and non-economic -of girls in many often subtle ways. Instrumental in this respect are gender relations within the Indian extended family system that are traditionally characterized by fundamental asymmetries. A lexicographic power structure with respect to sex and age underlies most intra-household transactions and decisions, with wives and daughters expected to obey decisions taken by male household members (Kandiyoti 1988) . Moreover, the importance of the family lineage and reputation affect men and women differently. While this does not apply to modern Westernized families, we will argue below that it may represent an ideal for some conservative Hindu households.
In this idealized setting, sons bring new (subordinate) members to a household while daughters, who join their husband's family, are lost to their parents. This has economic consequences in as far as household heads are able to command the economic resources of its female members (including dowry payments) and it has consequences for the distribution of power within families. Since the new wifes as young women occupy the lowest level of the hierarchy on top of being outsiders they increase the power of more senior female household members. The mistreatment of new wifes at the hands of their mother in law, a common theme in many Bollywood movies and a reality for many women (Greenberg 2003) , is an expression of this power structure. The tighter the control of male over female family members and the larger the larger the physical distance between wifes and their parents the larger one would expect the difference in worth between sons and daughters to be.
6 Part of this asymmetry translates into the value of mothers in a way that even in families where financial constraints might be secondary women giving birth to sons are held in higher regard than mothers of daughters.
Traditional ideas of honor and the importance of maintaining a honorable family reputation exacerbate the situation. At the center of this lies a definition of female moral integrity that views with outright hostility any contact between women and unrelated men and a type of spillover in which the actions of a particular family member affect the honor of the entire family. This is both the consequence of a traditional female ideal which values modesty and shamefulness above all and an issue of control. Unsupervised contact between men and women of different households signals a lack of control of the household over its female members. In that sense, women requiring permission to leave the house, even if granted, is a sign of control well exercised (Derne 1994) .
This has two economic consequences. Since female employment involves contact between men and women that can under most circumstances not be controlled and supervised by male family members, female wage rates are unlikely to affect employment by women in traditional households. If the work of female household members can be organized in a way that does not represent a potential threat to the family honor, say by mutual supervision of female household members, women are more likely to be economically valuable. Communal field work, for example, may be one of those instances.
Moreover, in a society where informal transactions are key to economic success, a loss of honor due to the behaviour of a female family member may well have serious material consequences on top of bringing shame to the family. While this is certainly true for wifes, its also holds for daughters. Girls are therefore much more of a risk to family honor than sons to whom the strict moral code does not generally apply.
The dowry situation has to be seen in this context of honor and expected female behaviour. Firstly, the payment of a dowry is likely to be more acceptable to traditional parents both because it is seen as the norm and because dowry negotiations can easily be included in the prenuptial contract of an arranged marriage. More modern ideas of courtship and dating, which would violate the honor of a conservative family, are less amenable to dowry demands although, of course, there are exceptions. Fernandez et al. (2002) 's argument that, at least in the US and with respect to education, men are marrying women that resemble their mothers is likely to apply in this context, too. Women from Westernized families would thus be more likely to marry men from similar family backgrounds and dowry might not be part of the wedding arrangements. Moreover, the loss of face associated with a cancelled wedding, that is with a rejected daughter, may make households embedded in a traditional cultural setting more susceptible to dowry blackmail.
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Within India, this type of family structure and value system is by no means universal. Rather it should be seen as a high-caste ideal associated with conservative Aryan (Hindu) ideology. Southern Indian Dravidian cultural norms as well as family organization in non-Hindu religions and even lower caste Hindu ideals and practices are likely to be different (Derne 1994) . What this implies, however, is that one might expect lower sex ratios in families that have adopted more closely the traditional high caste family values described above, either because of the financial implications or due to the underlying value system. The North-South divide in sex ratios widely accepted in the literature could thus be an outcome of cultural differences.
Unfortunately, parental preferences and the process of cultural determination of the costs and benefits of girls relative to boys are impossible to observe directly. Variables such as female labor force participation and wages or education, which have been used in previous studies, are only imperfect proxies. While they do reflect cultural aspects to some extent, they are also affected by purely economic determinants and it is in general difficult if not impssible to disentangle the two. The endogeneity of wages and the link between education, labor force participation and expected remuneration complicate the empirical analysis. Any attempt to isolate the cultural determinants sex-preferences, whether they operate through economic channels or affect preferences directly, therefore requires a measure of culture that is independent of economics. In this paper we therefore attempt to proxy cultural attitudes by voting behaviour. More precisely we assume that a conservative cultural mind-set which leads to both higher costs of raising girls and a possible anti-female bias in preferences makes voting for particular religious parties more likely.
Political parties and the sex ratio
Associating particular political parties with low sex ratios is without doubt controversial and one has to point out, therefore, that our argument does not imply that the parties in question actively discriminate against women or are in any way directly responsible for sex-selection. Furthermore, this should not be misconstrued as a statement about all religious parties without qualification. Nevertheless, we believe that there exists a link between anti-female bias and an ideological proximity to the Sangh Parivar (SP), literally a "family organization" of political parties, social institutions and paramilitary forces affiliated with the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).
8
Despite the often cited requirement that funerary rites should be performed by a son, this bias does not automatically come out of Hindu religious doctrine. Rather, gender relations in the SP are shaped by a particular nationalist agenda (Hindutva) that frames the current environment in terms of the defense of Hindu India against Muslim aggression (n.d.). Based on a particular interpretation of high-caste Hindu norms and combined with a strong anti-Muslim rhetoric, that is occasionally backed up by violent action, men are seen as the dominant force in gender relations with the male Hindu warrior image featuring strongly in the ideology Banerjee (2003) .
The role of women is more complex. On an abstract level, the body of a woman represents the Hindu motherland that is in danger of being violated by Muslim invaders as well as the purity of Hindu tradition unsullied by contact with Western ideas (Banerjee 2003 ). On a more physical level, Bacchetta (2004) observes that women are often described in their role as mothers and sisters and therefore as asexual beings in the official RSS propaganda. By denying their sexuality and describing them purely in terms of their relationship to men -mothers and sisters, not wives -women are essentially devoid of independent desires and personality. This is reflected in the official line on married life disseminated through seminars and literature for RSS members. Girls are supposed to acquiesce to the parental selection of a groom and self-choice is strongly discouraged ( n.d.). The tradition of the docile, defenseless wife is stressed. Rather than stand up for themselves, women are supposed to obey and support their husbands and blame themselves for any marital difficulties ( n.d., Banerjee 2003) . Male behaviour, including infidelity, on the other hand, is often excused by pointing to biological differences both in the RSS (Banerjee 2003) and in society more generally (Pintchman 2004) .
In order to test our hypothesis of a culturally determined sex-bias we therefore take voting for religious parties into account.
9 The parties associated with the RSS are dominated by the nationally-operating Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and include several local parties such as the Maharashtran Shiv Sena. Although we do not possess any information on the gender attitudes of the Muslim League and the Shiromani Akali Dal, we allow for the possibility of a connection between sex preferences and voting behaviour for Muslims and Sikhs, respectively.
Voting behaviour is certainly not determined solely by cultural attitudes; and the electoral success of the BJP and its allies in the 1990s can to a large extent be attributed to disillusionment with the performance of the Congress Party led government. Time-series of election results are thus probably not good indicators of changes in cultural attitudes. Inter-regional differences in voting behaviour, while reflecting local political and economic particularities, on the other hand, might be more indicative of underlying cultural differences. To be sure, not everyone who votes for a religious party is conservative in our sense, but conservative people are more likely to vote for religious (nationalist) parties ceteris paribus.
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The Data
The data used in the empirical analysis is compiled from three sources. Since we are interested in voting behavior which is not observable at the level of individual households we are restricted to using data collected at the district level, the highest level of disaggregation at which we can match election results, socio-economic variables and sex ratios. Including all Indian states and union territories 11 , we obtain data for 569 districts. With two exceptions, all dependent and explanatory variables are from the 2001 Census of India, which is originally available at the district level.
12
District-level measures of income and wealth are calculated from the 55th round of the Consumer Expenditure Schedule of the National Sample Survey Organization, administered during 1999 and 2000. In particular we use the natural logarithm of the median per capita household expenditure in a district to capture the purchasing power in a particular district.
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Voting behavior is obtained from electoral data for State Legislative Assemblies published by the Election Commission of India. State Legislative Assemblies are directly elected bodies set up to carry out the administration of the government in India's states and union territories. The choice of elections for state-level institutions instead of national elections does not imply that we view these as more appropriate proxies for cultural traditions. Rather, national parliamentary constituencies are larger than state assembly constituencies and often straddle districts, making it difficult to match election results to district-level socio-economic data. Since each district has between 1 and 37 representatives in the State Legislative Assembly and consists of the same number of assembly constituencies aggregation of election results is much easier.
Using election data from the election year immediately preceding 2001 in each state we first constructed a mapping of assembly constituencies into districts using various constituency delimitation orders as well as listings of constituencies included in each district from Bose & Singh (1988a , n.d., 1988b , 2000a . Religious parties were identified from the list of parties registered with the Election Commission of India using their political manifestos, often posted on the internet, news media and political alliances. A list of religious parties representing nationalistic Hindu, Sikh and Muslim groups can be found in Table 4 .
Results and discussion
The parameters estimated are obtained from a log linear regression model for the number of girls to boys both at birth and ages 0 to 5. Estimation is by Ordinary Least Squares. While both specifications have been used extensively in the literature on female disadvantage, they measure slightly different aspects of gender preferences. Abstracting from natural medical causes for a low sex-ratio, it can be argued that birth numbers are a more direct measure of sex preferences since survival rates are affected by differential susceptibility to post-natal and childhood diseases and the quality of the health care system. An opposite argument may be made equally convincingly: since the majority of Indian households do not have access to prenatal sex-selection technology, neglect after birth and unequal access to healthcare as documented by Oster (2005) might make the number of surviving children more representative of the desired ratio.
14 As we cannot claim to be able to determine which specification is more appropriate, we report the results of both specifications in tables 6 and 7, respectively. The first interesting result is the negative, statistically significant, coefficient for the median household expenditure variable: the higher the expenditure level of the median household in a district, the lower the sex ratio. Few authors have included explicit expenditure variables in their model and this negative correlation comes as somewhat of a surprise. The relaxation of income constraints discriminating against more expensive girls might have been expected to increase the relative number of girls born and raised. As pointed out above, however, at very low expenditure levels rising income may make sex selection affordable without giving households the resources to raise girls. With an average median district expenditure of 149 rupees (US$ 3.14) per capita and month and a minimum and maximum of only 42 rupees (US$ 0.88) and 539 rupees (US$ 11.30) 15 , respectively, this hypothesis does not seem unreasonable. The possible alternative, that dowries have an income elasticity exceeding one, would also be compatible with this result.
To examine the role of expenditure, that is of a combination of wealth and income, in more detail, we re-estimate the model with expenditure broken down by quartiles (table 8) . The results show that the negative correlation between expenditure and sex ratios is concentrated at the bottom half of the distribution, supporting our contention that the relationship is mainly caused by an increase in the budget constraint of the poor. At higher wealth and income levels, sex-selection becomes affordable.
Irrespective of which explanation is the correct one, this finding has profound consequences. Ceteris paribus, as income and wealth levels rise with economic growth, one might expect the relative number of girls to fall potentially for a considerable period of time. Relying on economic growth alone as a solution to the missing women problem might thus turn out to be the wrong policy, and one that might lead to significant social upheaval as the consecutive generations of men cannot find marriage partners. Due to asymmetric power structures in India, where men are traditionally in a dominant position, the relative scarcity of women is unlikely to lead to an improved bargaining position and women's rights might in fact deteriorate. "Bride abductions", wife sharing, forced prostitution and rape are likely consequences, unless existing laws are effectively enforced or the asymmetries are corrected.
A higher proportion of men being employed increases the relative number of girls. In as much as higher male labor force participation leads to higher income and expenditure this result seems counter-intuitive given the negative effect of median household expenditure. Female labor force participation in contrast has no statistically significant effect on sex ratios. This may be true for two reasons. First, households who contemplate sex selection might be qualitatively different from households where women consider working, due perhaps to a cultural reluctance to allow women to go to work. An increase in female employment opportunities would then be irrelevant to the sex selection decision. Alternatively, female earnings potential does not enter the decision about whether to have girls or not, either because of cognitive limitations or because it does not affect dowries and support in old age. The low female labor force participation rate of on average 28% seems to support the first conclusion.
The statistical insignificance of the proportion of literate women, that is of the number of women who have at least low levels of education, in both birth and child sex ratios is surprising, but has been observed by Das Gupta (1987) amongst others. A higher number of literate girls and women has often been interpreted as a sign of higher value for females, and therefore should be expected to be negatively correlated with discrimination against girls. This argument does not take the timing of events into account, however. It is well possible that ex ante parents prefer not to have a daughter, but once the daughter is born their optimal strategy is to provide at least some education for her in order to minimize their economic loss. If education is reasonably cheap, for example, and men desire educated wives in order to raise their own children, literacy might reduce dowry payments by enough to make it a worthwhile investment for parents of girls. In any case, the link between primary education and the 'value of women' is weak.
In a second argument, educated women are expected to be less culturally conservative as education is assumed to remove girls from their traditional environment and imbue them with more modern ideas. More modern women are then seen as having less of an anti-female bias, contradicting our regression result. In a cultural setting where women find themselves in a subordinate position, however, the values of women might not matter sufficiently to overcome traditions such as dowry and inability of daughters to provide for their parents in old age. Nonetheless, education affects child bearing behaviour with higher levels of education leading to lower fertility. Das Gupta (1987) points out that this might have negative consequences for the sex ratio. Since parents require a certain number of sons to secure their survival in old age and, in a rural setting, work the family land, a reduction in the total number of children will lead to more anti-female bias as long as the desired number of sons is larger than half the planned number of children. In addition, literate women might find it easier to obtain information about sex-determination and abortion.
Our finding suggests that none of these arguments are globally significant. In different households literacy might affect anti-female bias in different ways, but no overall valid argument can be supported statistically. Alternatively, asymmetries between male and female household members might render very low levels of education, measured by literacy rates, ineffectual for changing behaviour.
The evidence that agricultural reasons make having girls less desirable is ambiguous but -in our view -not compelling. Looking at birth ratios, the proportion of male cultivators, that is men working their own or rented land, does not have a significant effect if vote shares for political parties is included; in the specification without vote shares its coefficient is significant at the 10% level but too small to have any real effect. A larger number of female cultivators, leads to a statistically significant reduction in the sex ratio at birth, but again the effect is extremely small. Similar results are obtained for the proportion of agricultural laborers: the null hypothesis of no effect can be rejected at reasonable confidence levels, but the magnitude of the impact is small.
Together with the fact that there is no significant difference in sex ratios between urban and rural areas and that interacting all agricultural variables with geographic location to account for different crops does not alter the results, this casts considerable doubt on the agricultural labour demand hypothesis. Labor requirements for the dry-land farming practiced in the North of India are not sufficiently different from those of the Southern wet-land agriculture to alter sex-preferences. Since even in the North women perform all agricultural tasks with the exception of plowing and driving carts, the demand for sons for agriculture is unlikely to be very high and has probably fallen over the last decades as mechanization has reduced the time spent on male agricultural activities.
Apparently non-economic variables are undeniably highly significant, both statistically and in terms of the magnitude of their effects. The religious makeup of a particular district, for example, has a significant effect in all model specification. Care has to be taken, however, in interpreting the coefficients. Since the independent variable is the natural proportion of people in a given district identifying with a particular religion, the coefficients do not determine sex-ratio differentials between religious communities. Rather they have to be interpreted as the percentage change in the sex ratio caused by an increase in the demographic representation of a particular religious group. The proportion of Hindus has been omitted for two reasons. First, with around 76% of the population, Hindus represent the majority of Indians and are therefore a convenient base for comparison. Moreover, since religious classification in the survey is exhaustive, the relative size of the different religious communities is necessarily highly correlated. An increase in the proportion of one religion is accompanied by a decrease in another. Unlike in the case of binary independent variables, the magnitude of the coefficients for each of the religious communities thus does not directly represent inter-religious differences in sex ratios.
Examining the correlation between the relative sizes of the different religions in a district, one finds that the correlations between the share of Hindus and any other religion far exceed all other correlations. In other words, the expansion of a particular religious group most likely leads to a reduction in the proportion of Hindus. With the share of Hindus in a particular district omitted from the regression equation, the coefficients of the other religious groups can then be interpreted as approximately representing differences in sex ratios compared to the average Hindu population. The emphasis here is on "approximately" as the correlations are not perfect.
Bearing this in mind, we cannot reject the hypothesis that a higher proportion of Muslim families leads to less skewed sex ratios despite the popular stereotypes about Muslims and their attitude towards women. Compared to Hindus, Muslims appear to perform less sex-selective abortions and do not discriminate as much against girls -at least with respect to their survival chances. This may be related to the fact that unlike all other religions in India, Muslims do not pay dowries. Instead, the bride receives a "bride price" from the family of the groom. Moreover, according to Hussain & Billtes (2000) , 22% of marriages between Muslims are consanguineous, with first cousins being the preferred marriage partners. Almost one quarter of Muslim girls therefore remain part of their parents' extended family and can most likely help their parents in old age. Daughters are thus if anything less expensive.
The results for other religions is mixed. While an increase in the proportion of Christians reduces anti-female bias both at and after birth if the vote share of political parties is not included, we cannot reject that they do not have a positive effect on the sex ratio once voting is accounted for. Voting behaviour is crucial in explaining this result. As it is highly unlikely that Christians would vote for Hindu religious parties, an increase in the population share of Christians, through the accompanying decrease in the relative number of Hindus, is correlated with a decrease in the vote share for the BJP and its allies. The coefficient of the proportion of Christians picks up this correlation unless vote shares are explicitly accounted for. In consequence we can claim with some confidence that the sex ratios for Hindus and Christians do not differ significantly.
The share of Buddhists has no statistically significant effect. Both an increase in the Sikh and the Jain population lead to a reduction of the number of girls relative to boys born and in the age group between 0 and 5 years. The magnitude of the effect for Jains is particularly striking as it seems at odds with their aversion to killing even animals. Nonetheless, we are not aware of any research dealing with sex-selection or gender relations among Jains and cannot offer any explanation.
The low sex ratios for Sikhs is surprising and expected at the same time. While the official religious doctrine stresses gender equality and explicitly discourages dowry payments, there is ample anecdotal and systematic evidence that at least part of the Sikh community does not follow this particular aspect of religious teaching. In a detailed study of the Jat community in Northern India to which most Sikhs belong, Das Gupta (1987) points out the rigid and crass asymmetries between men and women. At the time of the study, the parents of women were expected to give gifts to their daughter and their in-laws as long as they are alive in addition to any dowry paid. They receive nothing in exchange. This one-way transfer of resources can be so extreme that they would be expected to pay even for the food they consume at their daughters new home. Women can also not inherit property and are generally excluded from participation in the public, civil and religious spheres.
Looking at scheduled castes, that is at Hindus belonging to the lowest caste, it appears that anti-female bias is more of a high-caste phenomenon at least for birth rates. Either scheduled castes do not have equal access to illegal abortions, a plausible explanation given the generally low economic status of the scheduled castes, or the traditional high-caste ideas of the appropriate female-male relationship have not been adopted by the scheduled castes. Caste differences disappear when children between 0 and 5 years are concerned. Unless girls are more likely to die than boys, an assumption not supported by the evidence (U.S. Census Bureau 2004), neglect of girls and differential access to healthcare reduces the sex-ratio for scheduled caste households to the average level for Hindus. This suggests that the low caste and therefore poorer families have less access to sex-selection technology but compensate for this after birth.
The importance of culture is reflected in the correlation between voting behavior and the number of girls relative to boys that are born and survive. In accordance with the observations that Muslims do not practice sex selection, we cannot reject the hypothesis that a high vote share for the Muslim League has no effect on sex ratios. A large number of votes for the Sikh Shiromani Akali Dal, on the other hand, appears to be correlated with less anti-female bias. This conclusion may be inaccurate however. The correlation between the vote share of the Shiromani Akali Dal and the proportion of the Sikh population in a district is found to be 0.966, making a clear separation of the Sikh population share and their voting behaviour impossible. The correlation between Muslim population and the election results of the Muslim League, on the other hand, is only 0.188. In consequence the statistical insignificance of the Muslim League is not due to collinearities. This may be due to two reasons. Either, the political program of the Muslim League is not particularly attractive to conservative Muslims or conservative Islam does not translate to low sex ratios. In light of the statistical insignificance of the Muslim population the second argument is certainly plausible.
The coefficient of the vote share for parties associated with the RSS is statistically significant at the 1% level and quite large. As we have argued above, one can make the claim that the BJP and its allies have an implicitly male agenda and that people with similar beliefs might therefore be more likely to vote for them. The regression results bear out this claim at least to some extent and can be interpreted as supporting the the link between cultural factors and low sex ratios.
Robustness of Results
Looking closer at the geographic distribution of both the sex ratios (2) and election results (3) one notices a distinct separation of India into two parts with low sex ratios as well as the electoral success of religious Hindu parties being concentrated in the North West of the country. In fact, this divide appears to be along roughly the same lines as Lahiri & Self (2004 , 2005 's village endogamy versus exogamy distinction. This, then, poses the question whether the statistical link between son preference and the success of RSS-linked parties is caused by a cultural tradition particular to the Northwest of India or whether other unobservable variables underly both phenomena.
In order to check the validity of our results, we divide India into four quarters along state lines. The division is somewhat arbitrary, but follows loosely the lan-guage division between the Hindi-speaking North and West and the Southern and Eastern states where local languages predominate. The exception is Maharashtra which is included in the Western region even though it has its own local language. We chose this division for two reasons. First, Maharashtra appears similar to the other Northwestern states: sex-ratios are below average and the electoral success of the Shiv Sena, a Maharashtran Hindu nationalist party, links it politically to the region.
16 Moreover, in contrast to Southern traditions, familiy strucutres tend to be partilocal. Secondly, by making sure that the states with below-average sex-ratios are contained in the same regions, we maximize the probability that inter-regional differences in behaviour are picked up by the regional control variable. In other words, we are defining the regions in a way that maximizes the strength of the robustness check. Table 9 summarizes the results for the sex ratios at birth and the relative number of girls between ages zero and five. Both regional controls and political variables are included.
17 As expected, the controls of the regions with below-average sex ratios (North and West) are significant a the 1% level and large. Not surprisingly also the coefficient for the vote share of Hindu and Sikh religious parties has decreased. Nevertheless, they are both still statistically significant and relatively large. This implies that even within the regions where son-preference is concentrated, districts with a high proportion of religious votes exhibit lower sex ratios. A general NorthSouth cultural divide cannot account for all the variation in sex ratios.
As mentioned in section 3, the vote shares of the religious parties refer to state assembly election results that immediately predate the 2001 household survey used for the analysis. Since fertility decisions necessarily predate the actual observed sex ratios, using past election data appears to reflect cultural attitudes at the time of the decision more closely, if not for births observed in 2001 then at least for the sex ratio of children under five. It can be argued, however, that past elections, through the composition of the state assemblies, affect unobservables such as access to health services or vaccination programs. If religious parties are more likely to implement anti-female health policies, this rather than culture may drive our result. A similar connection can be made to lax enforcement of anti-sex-determination laws or, more generally, legislation protecting female rights. While we believe that this is unlikely, especially since the lag between the elections and our time reference does in no case exceed 4 years and state-level healthcare provision and law enforcement procedures are probably slow to change, we re-estimated the relevant regression using post-2001 election data. This does not materially alter the conclusion (table 10) .
Lastly, we examine a population growth equilibrium argument for low sex-ratios (table 11) .
18 If the desired marriage age for females is lower than for men and marriage is required, high population growth implies that each wedding cohort (consisting of older men and younger women) has an excess of women. In order to achieve equilibrium in the marriage market, sex ratios in each birth cohort have to be reduced. Since there might be some scope for arguing that a possible correlation between voting behaviour and fertility decisions exists, district population growth rates were added to the original model specification. While the results provide evidence that population growth has a significant yet small impact on the ratio of boys and girls under 5, birth rates are not affected. Neither are the coefficients for the political variables.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to provide a link between economic and cultural causes for low sex ratios in India. We argue that culture enters parents' decision to discriminate against girls in two ways. First, due to culturally determined asymmetries in power and non-economic value between men and women, parental preferences might be skewed towards boys. Even if this is not the case, economic factors such as dowry payments and the inability of women to provide for their parents in old age make daughters more costly than sons and convince parents to engage in sex selection. These economic factors, we claim, are in turn influenced if not determined by cultural aspects.
Support for this argument can be found in the regression results. Unless Muslims actively discriminate against boys, a hypothesis for which there is no evidence, no religious community apart from Muslims appears to be immune to the pressures that lead to low sex ratios. The difference between Muslims and other religions is telling in this respect. The economic framework in which households operate, such as labor markets, the social security system or access to capital markets, should not be different for Muslims than all other religions. Cultural factors such as dowry payments, the relationship between in-laws and marriage patterns, on the other hand, vary between religious communities. This strengthens the argument that cultural aspects either by themselves or through economic incentives are instrumental in the anti-femal bias seen in many Indian regions.
The importance of culture in the prevalent anti-female bias poses additional challenges for policy makers. Instead of relying on rising income and the availability of better economic opportunities for women to lead to a more balanced sex ratio, cultural obstacles have to be overcome. The negative effect of higher median income found in the empirical analysis makes this point quite forcefully: income growth alone is not enough to remove the anti-female bias in India. Infact, rising income provides opportunities for further discrimination against females. Thus, any policy to reverse the trend of falling sex ratios has to change the relationship between men and women.
Changing cultural norms and the framework in which men and women interact is not a trivial task and one should not forget that gender equality is a relatively new concept even in Europe and the US. Since as economists we can say very little about social engineering and the sociology of gender relations we cannot outline a comprehensive program to reduce anti-female bias in India. What seems clear is that indoctrination will have to play a big part, be it in school or through government sponsored programs. The role of TV and the cinema industry in the gender debate should in our opinion not be underestimated. With a large part of the population having access to these types of media and given the impact of movies and soapoperas on behaviour and potentially cultural norms, a change in gender relations shown in movies might in the end affect cultural norms.
Such changes cannot occur over night, however, and more immediate measures have to be contemplated. Strict enforcement of existing laws is part of this. Both sex-selective abortion and dowry payments are illegal in India and it is the enforcement of the relevant laws that appears to be lacking. A combination of enforcement of existing laws and potentially new laws might be necessary to strengthen the power of women. This ranges from tough sentences for rape or forced marriage to a strong state reaction to allegations of spousal abuse. The message of the state has to be that women are equal and as valuable to men and that violence against them will not go unpunished. (2), and (4). *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. (2), and (4). *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. (2) and (4). *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. (2) and (4). *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. (2) and (4). *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. (2) and (4). *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
